A week ago, Zimbabwe's Lower House of Parliament, South Africa's equivalent of the National Assembly, passed a bill to amend the country's Constitution.
It was signed into law on 7 July 2026 by President Emmerson Mnangagwa, effectively becoming law.
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.3) Act, 2026, colloquially known as CAB3, was overwhelmingly supported by lawmakers, with many of them ZANU-PF members.
It extended the standard terms for the president, Parliament, and local authorities from five to seven years, with transitional provisions applying this new term to the current administration.
The law allows Mnangagwa, who was due to vacate office in 2028, to remain in power until 2030.
The law also scraps direct presidential elections, with future presidents to be chosen by Parliament.
It is the culmination of a campaign by the ruling Zanu-PF party, in power since independence in 1980, to amend the Constitution and extend presidential terms, a plan that received Cabinet backing back in February this year.
Since 1985, Zimbabwe has used a first-past-the-post electoral system to fill the vast majority of its legislative seats, while operating a mixed electoral framework that combines first-past-the-post with proportional representation for specific quotas.
The Lower House consists of 210 members who are directly elected using first-past-the-post in single-member constituencies. An additional 60 seats comprise women and special youth quotas that are allocated through a proportional representation system based on the party-list votes cast during the constituency elections.
In the Upper House of Parliament, or the Senate, members are chosen strictly via proportional representation. For the presidential race, the current system uses an absolute majority rule wherein a presidential candidate must secure an absolute majority, or more than 50% of the total vote.
If no candidate clears this threshold in the first round, a top-two run-off election is triggered.
Even before the law came into effect, the electoral system was already deemed problematic, with critics contending that it creates a disproportionate "winner takes all" dynamic that favours the ruling ZANU-PF.
The system also distorts the popular vote by creating a disconnect between a political party’s total national support and the number of parliamentary seats it secures.
This is because Zimbabwe is split into single-member geographic constituencies, resulting in a candidate only requiring a simple majority, even by just one vote, to claim 100% of that district's representation.
The remaining votes cast for losing candidates are completely disregarded. This distortion creates discrepancies that effectively silence or weaken opposition. The 2,000 parliamentary election gives a practical example of this.
The ruling ZANU-PF won 48% of the popular vote but secured 62 seats. On the other hand, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with an almost identical share of the vote, only secured 57 seats.
This demonstrates how the winner-takes-all approach disenfranchises opposition voters by failing to convert total votes into proportional legislative power.
On the surface, the new legislation works exactly like the system in South Africa, where the president is directly elected by the National Assembly. In theory, this approach fosters institutional consensus.
But there is a fundamental difference that makes the situation very different. Because in Zimbabwe, Parliament itself is built on a highly distorted constituency system where a simple majority secures the vote, the executive will be an extension of an uneven parliamentary layout.
Direct public participation is completely stripped off, while power is concentrated within a distorted legislature. Another consequence of the new legislation is that it shifts the responsibility for voter registration and the voters' roll from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to the Registrar-General, who is appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The primary difference between ZEC and the Registrar-General lies in their institutional mandates.
ZEC is the overall body responsible for preparing, conducting, and supervising all national elections and referendums, while the Registrar-General is a government department historically responsible for national civil registry data such as birth, death, and identity document records.
ZEC is by no means progressive. It has a perennial crisis of public confidence - a fact confirmed in a recent survey by the Public Policy and Research Institute of Zimbabwe (PPRIZ) with fieldwork by the Mass Public Opinion Institute.
The study found that 40.6% of Zimbabweans have no trust at all in ZEC - more than three times the distrust recorded for the President (12.5%) and more than double that of judges and the courts (17.3%). Distrust in election results in general was even higher, at 43%.
However, having the voter's roll in the custody of the Registrar-General erodes necessary checks and balances, while also recycling a problem that informed the very formation of an independent electoral body.
Before the constitutional amendments of 2013, following harmonised elections in which I worked as an observer with the SADC Election Observer Mission, based in Mazowe, in the Mashonaland Central Province, just 40km north of Harare, the Registrar-General was the custodian of the voters' roll.
This presented significant problems, at the centre of which were concerns about electoral fraud, which could be best facilitated by an institution already responsible for the national civil registry data, and one without the necessary independence.
The establishment of the Zimbabwe Electoral Delimitation Commission, tasked with drawing the country’s electoral boundaries, was also a function of the ZEC.
It is also not without criticism, with concerns that it would facilitate an incumbent advantage through gerrymandering.
This is not an abstract concern. Past delimitation exercises, particularly during the 2023 harmonised elections, faced severe criticism for manipulating urban-rural boundaries.
This concern still holds, for lines may be intentionally redrawn to fragment urban opposition strongholds and artificially expand the influence of the ruling ZANU-PF party in rural communities.
Furthermore, under CAB3, all members of the Zimbabwe Electoral Delimitation Commission are appointed directly by the President, creating a cyclical conflict of interest where the head of state selects the exact officials who draw the boundaries of the constituencies that determine parliamentary control.
The legislative changes in Zimbabwe should not be viewed as simply a national concern - they have implications for the broader SADC region.
By stripping ordinary Zimbabweans of the right to vote directly in presidential elections, ending a framework that has existed since 1987, the ruling ZANU-PF has effectively set parameters for sustained and even stronger contestation of future electoral outcomes.
This has historically been at the centre of political instability in Zimbabwe.
And because the country sits geographically at the heart of Southern Africa, its domestic crises immediately spill over borders, directly undermining regional integration, security, and economic development.
Economically, the crisis in Zimbabwe impacts the regional risk premium. International investors view SADC as a single economic ecosystem, the same way they do the European Union (EU) and other blocs.
Severe instability, policy uncertainty, and human rights crackdowns in Zimbabwe damage the investment profile of the entire region, artificially driving up the cost of capital for neighbouring democracies.
Additionally, Zimbabwe’s unresolved sovereign debt crisis and long-standing macroeconomic volatility delay macro-convergence goals across the bloc. This makes it impossible for SADC to establish a functional regional monetary union that would stabilise the regional economy.
But perhaps a greater challenge is the diplomatic friction and institutional paralysis that instability in Zimbabwe poses for the SADC region.
Zimbabwe’s disputed elections and human rights crackdowns routinely violate the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. The bloc's chronic inability or reluctance to hold Zimbabwe accountable diminishes its diplomatic credibility on a global stage.
A fractured SADC lacks a unified voice in major international forums like the African Union and the United Nations.
Individual member states hold weak bargaining power when negotiating trade agreements with economic giants like the EU, the United States, and China, placing them at a serious disadvantage that has direct implications for trade relations and developmental outcomes.
Regional instability means SADC member states continue to export raw materials rather than developing regional manufacturing value chains. There is also difficulty in the coordination of large-scale cross-border projects, which keep our transport, power, and digital networks fragmented. The implications of this are dire.
While it is crucial that SADC respects and upholds the sovereignty of member states, it is just as crucial that we are honest about the omissions and commissions of the member states.
They have an impact on the stability and prospects for the entire region.
The Zimbabwean question is not abstract - it expresses itself in the state of the entire region, and above all, in the futures of Zimbabweans and all Africans.
Malaika is a geographer and researcher at the Centre for Women and Gender Studies. She is a PhD in Geography candidate at the University of Bayreuth in Germany.